






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 important property of such a measure is that it should reveal for each trade, whether it is
likely to be information based. This is necessary, if one is to make conclusions about the
inﬂuence of informed trades on subsequent behavior of market participants. Simple measures
could be order arrival intensity, raw traded volume, or traded volume relative to quoted depth
(see Heﬂin and Shaw (2004)). Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) developed a
structural model in which the probability of information-based trading can be estimated from
the order ﬂow over a given time period. In their approach, an information event occurs
with some probability and, if it occurs, it could be bad news or good news. The arrivals
of informed and uniformed traders are assumed to be determined by Poisson processes with
speciﬁc arrival rates. The model is easy to estimate and has shown that more infrequently
traded stocks have a higher probability of informed trading. Furthermore it allows for an
analysis of informed trading over time. One possible drawback, however, is that conditioning
only on order ﬂow can lead to some misleading results. To illustrate this point, assume that we
have a booming economy. Under this condition there are more buys than sells and stock prices
are systematically rising. Given such conditions a positive imbalance between buys and sells
would be more attributable to public information about the macroeconomic conditions, rather
than on particular positive news known only by a small portion of the traders. Consequently, a
market maker would not be surprised to receive a buy order and would not have big incentives
to alter the adverse selection fraction of the spread. Thus order imbalance is not necessarily a
consequence of informed trading. In order to classify a trade as informed or not it is necessary
to take into account not only the order imbalance, but also other characteristics describing the
market conditions. In the previous example it would be appropriate to condition for example
on the return of a broad economy index. Furthermore, the model uses aggregated data and
does not deliver any insights as to whether a particular trade is information-based or not.
Many studies have addressed how trades inﬂuence the subsequent quote revision. Lee,
Mucklow, and Ready (1993) recognize that both quoted prices and quoted depths should be
viewed as important characteristics of market liquidity and the quote setting behavior of the
dealers. They show that spreads increase and depths drop in response to an increase in volume.
Hasbrouck (1991) argues that the informational content of a trade must be inferred not from
total trade size but from the part which was unanticipated. He, however, excludes the relation
of trade size to the quoted depth, which has some consequences on the quote revision process.
This has been shown by Petersen and Umlauf (1994). They ﬁnd that most of the variation in
quote revision is explained by whether the trade size exceeds the quoted size. Furthermore,
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) analyze what sources of information the specialist uses
when updating the his quote prices and sizes. They also ﬁnd that transactions that exceed
the quoted depth contain more information and induce larger quote revisions.
Our contribution to this literature is to link the surprise or unanticipated component
of trades to the quote revision process. Our framework allows for including the eﬀects of
the relation of quote size to trade size in classifying trades. Another important advantage
of the speciﬁcation is the possibility of including a broad set of variables (information set),
which determine the expected trade category. For example, Hasbrouck (1991) models the
quote midpoint and signed trade volume as a bivariate VAR. Thus, the trade innovation is
the component of the trade which cannot be explained by previous trades and quote revisions.
This, however, is only a small part of the information set of the market participants, which
includes also other aspects of the market, as current price volatility, trading activity (not only
2measured by the quantity of past trades, but also the time between transactions), market
index movements, etc.
To address these issues we develop an empirical framework which allows us to capture
the degree of unexpectedness of a given trade, conditional on the current market conditions.
Trades are classiﬁed in six categories according to their direction and size relative to the quoted
depth. Conditional on current market characteristics, each trade is predicted to fall into one
of these categories. The surprise is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the predicted and the
true outcome. We presume that there is a relationship between this surprise measure and
the reaction of the market-maker measured by the spread revision. If a market-maker aims
and expects balanced trading but faces one sided orders, this would probably mean that his
spreads are such that informed traders can proﬁt. Therefore he will react to this deviation of
the order ﬂow from his expectations. In order to analyze whether this surprise measure has
an impact on spreads, we use regression analysis where as explanatory variables we include
also raw traded volume, traded volume relative to quoted depth, and an aggregate volume
measure, which serves as an indicator for short-run market activity.
The results show that there is a positive relationship between the unexpectedness of a
trade and the consequent bid-ask spread, which conﬁrms the hypothesis that the market-maker
reacts to surprise by widening the spread in order to protect himself from informed traders.
Moreover, once we control for autocorrelation in spreads, the volume variables mentioned
above have little additional explanatory power.
Our approach also allows us to test the signiﬁcance of certain indicators describing the
current market conditions for the determination of the buy-sell pressure. Thus, for example,
we can use likelihood-based tests to check whether spread (as hypothesized in Hall and Hautsch
(2004)), volatility, or market activity have an impact on the net buy-sell pressure.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the determinants of trade
size relative to the quoted depth. Section 3 contains an overview of the data and discusses
some problems arising from the use of a particular trade classiﬁcation algorithm. In Section 4
we estimate a model for the information of informed trading in order to conﬁrm some ﬁndings
in the literature. Section 5 contains the estimation results. In the next section a measure
of the degree of unexpectedness of a given trade is deﬁned, which serves as a proxy for the
probability of that trade being informed. Its relation to spreads is also analyzed. The last
section concludes.
2 Trade Size Relative to Quoted Depth and Its Determinants
An underlying assumption of our model is that there is an agent, who bases his decision to
trade on some information, available at the time of the decision. We will call this information
set "the current market conditions". The set of market conditions include the current bid and
ask prices, market activity, volatility, market movements and so on. Of course, this decision is
driven also by liquidity needs and private information, which are unobservable for the market-
maker posting quotes. The market maker quotes in an optimal way (observing a given set
of rules of the exchange), which means that he can inﬂuence the decision of the traders in
order to maintain some optimal holdings of the stock and to protect himself from losses. If
3the direction and/or the size of next trade deviate from what he expected and aimed at,
the market-maker can make some inference about the information content of the trade and
possibly react by changing his quote. This change reﬂects the change in beliefs and deviation
from some optimal holding of the stock.
In this paper, we deﬁne the types of trades according to their direction (buy or sell) and
relation to the quoted depth. More precisely, letting the type of trade be denoted by Zt
2 there
are six possible values:
1. Zt = 1 – a sale of more shares than the current bid size,
2. Zt = 2 – a sale of the same number of shares as the current bid size,
3. Zt = 3 – a sale of less shares than the current bid size,
4. Zt = 4 – a buy of less shares than the current ask size,
5. Zt = 5 – a buy of the same number of shares as the current ask size,
6. Zt = 6 – a buy of more shares than the current ask size3.
In order to specify a meaningful econometric tool to model Zt we assume that there
is an unobservable variable, whose outcome determines the outcome of Zt. In our case this
unobservable variable can be interpreted as the readiness of the agent to buy a given number
of shares relative to the current bid size4. Increasing values of this variable correspond to the
discrete variable taking on a higher value (e.g. a large negative value for the readiness to buy
would result in a large sale, the variable Zt = 1, etc.). Thus, the categories Zt are ordered and
a suitable econometric speciﬁcation for Zt is the ordered probit model. Appendix A describes
the model and its estimation by maximum likelihood.
Next, we turn to the description of the determinants of trade outcome. We start with a
broad set of market conditions consisting of the following variables:
² SELLSIZEt – the number of shares the specialist is willing to buy at his best bid price
(in thousands of shares),
² BUY SIZEt – the number of shares the specialist is willing to sell at his best ask price(in
thousands of shares),
² PREV V OLt¡i for i = 1;2;3 – the signed volumes of the last three trades (in thousands
of shares),
² SPREADt – the prevailing bid-ask spread at the time of the transaction,
² SUMDURt – the sum of the last three trade durations (in seconds),
2Here t is an index for transaction time. Although the usual notation is ti, here this would only clutter
the notation.
3The terms bid and ask size refer to the quantities quoted by the market maker at the best bid and ask
price respectively.
4Negative values are interpreted as the readiness to sell.
4² V OLAt – the sum of the squared midquote changes over the last three trades,
² PORTRETt – the return of a capitalization-weighted portfolio of stocks over the last
ﬁve minutes prior to the trade.
Considering the ﬁrst two variables it is important to mention that on the NYSE open
book policy has been introduced since January 24th 2002. This allows investors to see the entire
limit order book, with all its quote levels. For 2001, which is the period we investigate, the
traders could only see the best bid and ask with their corresponding sizes. Since those quotes
are binding, an investor willing to trade up to the quoted size received speed of execution
and a ﬁrm price. For trades bigger than the quoted size, which were submitted electronically
without further conditions about the execution price, the trader received speed of execution
but also an uncertain price for the volume above the best quoted size, which could be executed
at multiple price levels. This has a twofold implication: ﬁrst, the investors could not condition
their decisions on prices and depths beyond the best quote; and second and more interesting
– given that the execution price for the volume above the best quoted size was uncertain, such
an order would deﬁnitely imply some hastiness on the part of the trader. Usually impatient
traders are informed traders.
We further include the variable SUMDURt to capture current market activity, V OLAt
as an indicator of short-term volatility and PORTRETt as an indicator of recent market
movement5.
Given this set of market conditions, we could hypothesize on their possible impact on the
trade category. Depth is one of the dimensions of liquidity. Hence a larger depth will ceteris
paribus most probably lead to larger trade volumes. The question we are addressing here,
however, is not the absolute impact, but the relative increase in trade size (as a proportion of
the quoted depth) as the depth increases. If the relationship were linear, this relative impact
would be zero. Convex relationship, implying positive relative impact, has the interpretation
that the eagerness to trade increases more than proportionally with the quoted depth. We
do not ﬁnd any meaningful reason to support this possibility. A concave relationship might
be explained by an asymmetric information argument: when a market-maker oﬀers a large
number of shares at a comparatively low ask price (and a relatively unattractive bid), this
means that he is willing to sell, or put it diﬀerently he invites traders to buy from him.
This can either be because he has moved away from some optimal portfolio and wants to
unload some shares of a given stock, or because he fears that he has taken the losing side in
a previous informed transaction (in this case he has bought possibly overvalued shares) and
wants to reverse his position as soon as possible to curb his losses. This informational content
of an asymmetric depth might hold an investor oﬀ from trading on the "attractive" side of
the quote. Thus we expect either a negative sign or zero for the BUY SIZE variable, which
can be interpreted as a test of linearity against concavity of the relationship between depth
and trade size. Analogously we can argue about the positivity of SELLSIZE coeﬃcient6.
The next plausible hypothesis is that positive past volumes (buy trades) have a positive
impact on the buying pressure. This can be supported by the herding behavior (or momentum)
5Replacing this variable with the stock’s own return does not change the results signiﬁcantly.
6In an ordered probit model the signs of the coeﬃcients are not so straightforward to interpret. At least
for the two extreme categories, however, a positive coeﬃcient implies a smaller probability for the ﬁrst and a
larger probability for the last category. See Appendix A and Greene (1997).
5found in stock markets. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) discuss diﬀerent reasons for this
phenomenon, one of which is the informational explanation. Thus an investor might copy
other investors if she believes that others have traded on some information. On the one hand,
informed investors have an incentive to hide their trades among the liquidity trades. Thus,
if they have observed a positive signal, they will prefer to buy when others are buying. This
makes it hard for the market-maker to distinguish between informed and uninformed trading.
On the other hand, value traders (see Harris (2003), Chapter 8 for a discussion of diﬀerent
types of informed traders) will trade if the price deviates from their estimate of fundamental
values. Thus a sequence of buys which drives the price upwards, may cause value traders to
sell if the price has risen substantially above their estimate. Thus trade reversals contain a
higher probability of being informed.
A larger spread leads to lower liquidity and higher trading costs. Hence, it will lead to
less trades both on the buy and the sell side. Hall and Hautsch (2004) ﬁnd that spread is
insigniﬁcant for explaining the buy-sell pressure. Although large bid-ask spreads make limit
orders more attractive than market orders, there is no reason for buy- or sell-initiated orders
to be aﬀected in a diﬀerent manner. We also argue that a larger spread most probably leads
to smaller trades, but this impact is symmetric on both sides of the market, and hence no
particular direction of the coeﬃcient can be expected.
Market activity in terms of the frequency of trading, after having accounted for the
direction and the volume of past trades, is also not expected to aﬀect the buy and sell pressure
in an asymmetric way. Higher volatility might make the stock unattractive to investors and
hence induce less buying. Consequently, a negative coeﬃcient is hypothesized.
The last variable in the conditional mean speciﬁcation is the return of a capitalization
weighted portfolio of the 24 stocks over the 5 minutes preceding the current trade. More
precisely, we sample the trade prices at one minute intervals using last-tick interpolation.
From the series of equally spaced 1-minute price observations we construct a series of 1-
minute log-returns. For each trade we ﬁnd the price at the beginning of the minute the trade
occurred, and sum the ﬁve preceding 1-minute log-returns. For example, if a trade occurred
at 10:37:05 the variable PORTRET will be the log-return of the portfolio from 10:32:00 to
10:37:00. Economic intuition suggests that there will be more buys when the market is rising.
This is the so called "momentum trading". Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) ﬁnd
several explanations for the proﬁtability of momentum strategies. One of their ﬁndings is
that markets absorb new information slowly. Especially, they note that a positive earnings
announcement surprise is on average followed by surprises in the same direction at least over
the next two subsequent announcements. There are, however, traders who employ contrarian
strategies. That means they buy when the price is falling and sell when the price is rising.
These traders have a stabilizing inﬂuence on prices. For this reasons it is hard to say a priori
what the sign on the coeﬃcient of PORTRET should be.
3 The Data
The data we use is extracted from the NYSE TAQ (Trades and Quotations) Database for
the period January 2nd to December 30th of 2001, consisting of 248 trading days. The TAQ
database consists of quotations and trade datasets for each stock traded on the NYSE, AMEX
6or the US regional exchanges. For our analysis we select the following 24 stocks with diﬀerent
levels of trading activity: Alcoa (NYSE ticker symbol: AA), Boeing (BA), Black & Decker
(BDK), Caterpillar (CAT), Citigroup (C), Colgate Palmolive (CL), Du Pont (DD), Walt Dis-
ney (DIS), Fair Isaac (FIC), General Electric (GE), Jack in the Box (JBX), J. P. Morgan
Chase(JPM), Coca Cola (KO), Lockheed Martin (LMT), McDonalds (MCD), 3M (MMM),
Altria Group (MO), Merck (MRK), Nike (NKE), Procter & Gamble (PG), SBC Communi-
cations (SBC), AT&T (T), United Tech (UTX), Wal-Mart Stores (WMT). The stocks were
chosen at random, but in such a way that we have variation in their trading activity and
traded volume.
The trade database contains the time, volume, and price of each trade. The quote
database comprises the time of the quote update, the bid price, the ask price, and the corre-
sponding volumes on the two sides. The sample precedes the introduction of the open book
policy on the NYSE. Thus, the absence of information about the entire limit order book is
not particularly harmful here. This is so, because at that time investors did not see the limit
book either, hence this information could not be in their information set. This is illustrated
in Figure 1. The bid and ask prices as well as the corresponding depths (represented by thick
lines) were known to the public, while limit orders placed at worse prices (drawn in dashed
lines) were not. The most severe drawback of this type of dataset for our purposes, is that
it is not immediately clear whether the trade was buyer or seller initiated. This, combined
with some delay of trade reporting can lead to problems with trade classiﬁcation. To address
this problem, we use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm which has been shown to perform
reasonably well, although misspecifying a certain number of trades. It should be noted that
here this problem is further aggravated by the fact that we also use the ratio of traded volume
to the size of the corresponding quote to categorize the transactions in the six categories. This
will inevitably lead to some trades falling into the wrong categories.
To make this point clearer, we illustrate it by the following example. Consider that the
stock XYZ at 09:59:59 is quoted 99.90 (1000 shares) bid and 100.00 (500 shares) ask. Three
seconds later, a limit sell order for 1000 shares at 100.00 is entered. Thus, the quotes at
10:00:02 are bid 99.90 (1000 shares) and ask 100 (1500 shares). Now, consider that a trade
report is recorded at 10:00:05 with a price of 100.00 and a quantity of 1200 shares. According
to the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm this will be classiﬁed as a buyer initiated trade. In
this case, concerning the classiﬁcation of the trade, it is of no importance whether the valid
quote at the time of the market order was the one at 09:59:59 or at 10:00:02. In any case this
was a buy. For our purposes, however, judging by the rule that the quote which is at least
5 seconds old is the correct one, will lead us to categorize the trade as a buy larger than the
size at the ask side (category 6). If, however, in this case the record was not actually delayed
and the true quote was really the one at 10:00:02, then the trade should be classiﬁed as a buy
smaller than the ask size (category 4). It is reasonable to assume that among the misspeciﬁed
trades the ones that have been too extremely categorized (categories 1 and 6), will be more
than the ones too moderately categorized.
These classiﬁcation-induced errors will have as a consequence that the shares of the
extreme categories will be more likely biased upwards at the expense of the middle ones. As a
result this can only make the predictive performance of the ordered probit model worse than
it actually is, since it turns out that the percent correctly predicted cases is the lowest for the





ask size bid size
Figure 1: A snapshot of the limit order book at a given point of time.
Note: The ﬁgure shows a representation of an order book at a given point of time. Bid and ask price
refer to the best prices at which an investor could sell or buy. Bid size and ask size are the depths,
corresponding to the bid and ask prices, which were known to investors. The dashed lines represent
limit orders with prices worse than the bid and ask price. These orders were not disclosed to the
public.
8Table 1: Total number of trades and percentages of trades in the six categories.
AA CAT FIC KO MCD MO NKE BDK
% trades in Cat. 1 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.11
% trades in Cat. 2 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.10
% trades in Cat. 3 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.24
% trades in Cat. 4 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.34
% trades in Cat. 5 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.10
% trades in Cat. 6 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.12
Total number of trades 361054 304764 62847 403178 427090 469120 211700 135673
CL JBX LMT BA C DIS GE JPM
% trades in Cat. 1 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19
% trades in Cat. 2 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04
% trades in Cat. 3 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.21
% trades in Cat. 4 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.31
% trades in Cat. 5 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05
% trades in Cat. 6 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.20
Total number of trades 293132 52818 233623 418831 765039 483788 772361 627963
MMM MRK PG T WMT UTX SBC DD
% trades in Cat. 1 0.17 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.15
% trades in Cat. 2 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07
% trades in Cat. 3 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.36 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.26
% trades in Cat. 4 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30
% trades in Cat. 5 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.07
% trades in Cat. 6 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.16
Total number of trades 377775 478970 458499 453245 577617 326531 550948 449139
pronounced if we could have an error-free trade classiﬁcation. The distribution of the trades
in the six categories described above is given in Table 1.
Due to the reasons discussed above we expect that due to the trade classiﬁcation algo-
rithm, some of the trades which should have been classiﬁed in categories 2 to 4 have migrated
to the extreme categories 1 and 6. Thus we expect that especially categories 2 and 5 are in
fact larger than what is reported in the table.
4 A Structural Model For the Probability of Information
The Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) (hereafter EKOP) model is a structural
model which estimates the probability of information, based on the diﬀerence between the
buy and sell order ﬂow. It assumes that with a certain probability (®) in the beginning of the
trading period there is new information in the market, which is revealed only to some traders.
This information, if it exists, can be a bad signal with probability ±. Further, the arrival
rates of informed and uninformed traders are modelled as independent Poisson processes,
with intensity ¹ and ², respectively. The parameter vector µ = f®;±;¹;²g0 is then estimated
by maximum likelihood and an estimate for the probability of informed trading is given by
c PI =
^ ®^ ¹
^ ®^ ¹ + 2^ ²
:
9Figure 2: Probability of information for three volume quantiles.
Note: The ﬁgure plots the estimated probability of informed trading against 90-day rolling window
estimation samples. The results are averaged over stocks in three volume quantiles.
We compute the number of buys and sells for each day in the period and estimate the model
based on a rolling window of 90 days. Speciﬁc to the period in our study is that the number
of buys was in general larger than the number of sells in almost all months. This led to the
problem that in some cases the function reached a maximum when the parameter ± was on
the lower boundary of its [0;1] range. The booming US economy in that period led to heavy
investment on the part of private and institutional investors. Thus the positive buy-sell order
imbalance could hardly only be explained by positive private information, as found by the
model. In general, our ﬁndings are similar to those in EKOP: grouping the stocks into three
volume quantiles7, we ﬁnd that the probability of news occurring is highest for the highest
volume stocks, while the c PI is lowest. This is explained by the much larger intensity of arrival
of uninformed traders in the large volume quantiles. Figure 2 plots the series of c PI as a
function of the rolling 90-day windows. EKOP ﬁnd in their sample of 90 stocks that stocks
in the ﬁrst volume decile have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of informed trading compared
to the ﬁfth and eighth decile, while the diﬀerence between the ﬁfth and eighth deciles is not
signiﬁcant. Since our sample of stocks is in general comprised of more active stocks than theirs,
considering Figure 2 we also ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that among the large stocks there
is similar probability of informed trading. Both ﬁndings together indicate that it is likely that
the stocks can be in general separated into two groups of similar probability – those with high
probability (low volume stocks) and those with low probability (high volume stocks).
It is a little bit puzzling that our estimates of the probability of informed trading are far
lower than what was found by EKOP. A possible explanation is that their sample is 11 years
7based on the overall traded volume
10Table 2: Average estimates, z-statistics and p-values for Alcoa
Parameters Average Average Average
estimates z-statistic p-value
SPREAD -0.2681 -1.0872 0.3008
SELLSIZE 0.0378 20.5664 0.0000
BUYSIZE -0.0291 -21.2924 0.0000
PREVVOL1 0.0381 10.7702 0.0000
PREVVOL2 0.0114 6.4802 0.0003
PREVVOL3 0.0064 5.2802 0.0001
SUMDUR -0.0001 -0.5656 0.3178
VOLA 0.0000 0.6826 0.2934
PORTRET 42.9163 6.8116 0.0000
Note: The table contains average coeﬃcient values, z-statistics and p-values from 12 ordered probit
estimations for Alcoa. The dependent variable is the trade category. Each estimation is based on a
sample of one month. Estimates of the threshold parameters as well as a parameter of the conditional
heteroscedasticity speciﬁcation (see Appendix A) are not reported.
"older" than ours. It is a fact that within the period 1990-2000 the NYSE has succeeded in
becoming a more transparent and active marketplace, which could be the reason for a decrease
in informed trading as a proportion to overall trading activity. Furthermore, the NYSE has
an active policy to prevent insider trading. Thus, these ﬁndings indicate that changes such as
the decimalization since 19. January 2001 have enhanced market transparency and the price
discovery process.
5 Estimation Results and Interpretation of the Trade Category
Model
Initially we estimate the model based on monthly subsamples for each stock in order to conﬁrm
our expectations about the sign and signiﬁcance of the variables based on large samples. The
optimization converges for all stocks for almost all months. For the most heavily traded stock
(General Electric) each monthly sample has approximately 55000 observations, while for the
least active Fair Isaac (FIC) and Jack in the Box (JBX) there are some 3000 observations
per month. The estimation results across stocks and subsamples are strikingly similar, which
conﬁrms the plausibility and robustness of the speciﬁcation. From a total of approximately 250
estimation outputs we illustrate in Table 2 average coeﬃcient values (from the 12 estimations
based on monthly subsamples), as well as z-statistics and p-values for Alcoa.
The ﬁrst result which is observed is that even though the samples are large, quite often
the coeﬃcients on SPREAD and SUMDUR are statistically insigniﬁcant even at 5% conﬁdence
levels, based on the z-statistic which is asymptotically standard normal under the null hypoth-
esis, that the coeﬃcient is equal to zero. These ﬁndings are consistent with our hypotheses
in Section 2. The insigniﬁcance of the variable measuring current stock volatility, however,
contradicts the intuition that high volatility will increase the sell pressure. Thus, although
11Table 3: Likelihood ratio test statistics and p-values for the joint signiﬁcance of
SPREAD, SUMDUR and VOLA for ﬁve stocks.
Alcoa Caterpillar Fair Isaac Coca Cola McDonald’s
LR p-value LR p-value LR p-value LR p-value LR p-value
January 12.5363 0.0058 6.6390 0.0843 13.6570 0.0034 2.0790 0.5562 4.8624 0.1822
February 2.4135 0.4911 4.3295 0.2280 2.7726 0.4280 6.5567 0.0875 0.6052 0.8952
March 9.6956 0.0213 2.3214 0.5084 6.2597 0.0996 5.5520 0.1356 10.7068 0.0134
April 7.5889 0.0553 4.3602 0.2251 8.3672 0.0390 12.1519 0.0069 12.4978 0.0059
May 13.4475 0.0038 38.8512 0.0000 3.2906 0.3490 5.8858 0.1173 23.5160 0.0000
June 16.7260 0.0008 12.4420 0.0060 5.4579 0.1412 10.8642 0.0125 3.7979 0.2841
July 15.7045 0.0013 4.5513 0.2078 15.3432 0.0015 6.2327 0.1008 14.8100 0.0020
August 8.1531 0.0430 8.0236 0.0455 5.6235 0.1314 31.4016 0.0000 5.9818 0.1125
September 5.9215 0.1155 19.8733 0.0002 2.6902 0.4419 11.1995 0.0107 7.3892 0.0605
October 4.4314 0.2185 5.6451 0.1302 5.3961 0.1450 2.6964 0.4408 15.7912 0.0013
November 3.3559 0.3399 16.1013 0.0011 5.2529 0.1542 15.2319 0.0016 21.1990 0.0001
December 22.9867 0.0000 42.2005 0.0000 0.4827 0.9227 13.2989 0.0040 26.0638 0.0000
high volatility might hold investors oﬀ from trading, it does not do so in an asymmetric way.
To check the joint signiﬁcance of the three parameters we conduct likelihood-ratio tests. Since
the results look quite similar across stocks, we report the values of the test statistic as well
as the corresponding p-value8 for ﬁve randomly chosen stocks in Table 3. Considering the
large samples, the table presents an overwhelming support for the conjecture that the three
variables do not inﬂuence the buy and sell order submission asymmetrically. Of course, for
stocks with fewer observations these conclusions are most obvious.
The coeﬃcients on the depth variables are highly signiﬁcant and have the signs we
expected. This conﬁrms the concave relationship between trade size and quoted depth. Thus
we ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that the market-maker’s depth quotes contain information
about his valuation of the stock or inventory imbalances.
The past volume variables also have the signs we expected. Positive past volumes (buy
trades) have a positive impact on the buying pressure. This impact, however, quickly di-
minishes as we can see from the relative sizes of the coeﬃcients9. This ﬁnding supports the
herding behavior (or momentum) found in stock markets.
Further, we ﬁnd evidence from the estimation results that the return of a stock portfolio
has a signiﬁcant positive impact on the buy-sell pressure. This is in line with the hypothesis
that traders are more willing to buy when the market is going upwards. Thus, although there
might be trading by contrarian traders, it is not enough to reverse the momentum caused by
traders who buy when prices are rising and sell otherwise. Another important implication of
the signiﬁcance of this coeﬃcient is that judging about the presence of private information
solely by the trade imbalance, misses to account for an important factor driving this imbalance.
8The test statistic has a Â
2 distribution with 3 degrees of freedom.
9We can compare the sizes of these three coeﬃcients, because the associated variables have the same
measurement units – size of trade in thousands of shares.
126 A Trade-by-Trade Surprise Measure and Its Relation to Spreads
The drawback of estimating the model based on monthly subsamples is that it implicitly as-
sumes that the economic relation stays stable within such a long period. Fortunately, the great
number of observations enables us to perform the model estimation on daily subsamples10. By
considering smaller subsamples we add ﬂexibility to the speciﬁcation by allowing for temporal
changes of the relationship. Examining the time series of coeﬃcients it is clear that although
they are quite stable, there is still some variation in time.
The ordered probit model can deliver predictions of the discrete variable Zt (the trade
category), given the characteristics of a given trade. McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) suggest the
following methodology to use the maximum likelihood estimates to predict the ordinal variable
Zt: given a particular observation Xt = (X1t;:::;Xqt)
0, let ^ Pt;k be the predicted probability
that the dependent variable Zt is in the k ¡ th category. This probability is computed as11:
^ Pt;k = ©
Ã











where ^ ¾t =
p
1 + ^ °2
1Dt. Letting ^ Zt be the maximum likelihood prediction of Zt, we have
^ Zt = kt;
where kt is the value 1 · kt · M which maximizes ^ Pt;kt. A typical goodness-of-ﬁt measure
of ordered probit models is the percentage of correctly classiﬁed Zt. A typical ﬁgure in our
estimations is 40% with the percentage for categories 3 and 4 as high as 80%, while for the
extreme categories it drops down to several percent. This poor performance in predicting
the extreme categories can be partially attributed to errors due to the trade classiﬁcation
algorithm. Of course, it is also to be expected that those trades contain the biggest proportion
of surprise and are therefore hard to predict.
Having a prediction about the category of a trade, conditional on the prevailing market
conditions at this point of time, we deﬁne a surprise measure as
St = ^ Zt ¡ Zt:
Thus, a correctly predicted trade will have a zero surprise, while in the extreme case where
a large buy is predicted but a large sell actually occurred, the surprise will take on a value
of 5. This measure has a nice intuitive interpretation. If the market maker expects a buy,
given his spread and depth and the market conditions, and he is confronted with a market sell
order, then this unexpected event carries information and will most likely be reﬂected in the
quote setting behavior of the market maker. Consequently, we expect a positive relationship
between the absolute value of the surprise measure and the following spread12.
In order to check our hypothesis we run OLS regressions for each stock and each day,
where we regress the spread of the tth transaction on a constant, the previous surprise, and
10For the least active stocks we use two days of trading as a subsample.
11See Appendix A for details.
12As mentioned by Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) on the NYSE the specialist’s quote reﬂects the aggregate
supply of liquidity from limit orders and standing orders, as well as his own trading intentions. Thus, his
behavior represents that of all liquidity suppliers.
13Table 4: Number of signiﬁcantly positive parameters in the OLS regression (1)
under the restriction ¯3 = ¯5 = 0 based on t-tests at 1% and 5% signiﬁcance levels,
respectively.
Walt Disney Citigroup GE Caterpillar Alcoa
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
¯1 147 174 234 239 221 229 58 92 62 92
¯2 139 161 108 119 112 133 134 163 172 192
¯4 123 137 221 230 178 187 75 90 109 127
Boeing Coca Cola McDonald’s Jack in the Box Lockheed Martin
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
¯1 145 179 73 103 91 126 16 29 24 38
¯2 104 128 169 188 141 172 17 30 46 65
¯4 115 128 105 134 78 94 28 39 43 51
Note: The regression SPRt = ¯0+¯1RAWSt¡1+¯2RELSt¡1+¯3jSt¡1j+¯4V OLt¡1+¯5SPRt¡1+";
is estimated for each of the 248 days in the sample, except those for which we did not have estimates
of the ordered probit model and jSt¡1j was not available. The stock with the most such cases is GE
with 7 days for which the maximum likelihood did not converge. For Jack in the Box and Lockheed
Martin we have 120 regressions on 2-day samples.
several control variables. In particular, we consider the following linear regression
SPRt = ¯0 + ¯1RAWSt¡1 + ¯2RELSt¡1 + ¯3jSt¡1j + ¯4V OLt¡1 + ¯5SPRt¡1 + "; (1)
where SPRt is the bid-ask spread at the time of the tth transaction, RAWSt is the raw
volume size (in thousands of shares), RELSt is the trade volume relative to the quoted depth
on the corresponding side of the market13, St is our surprise measure, and V OLt is the
accumulated volume of the last 100 trades (including the tth). This variable was included since
Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) present some evidence that there is a positive relationship
between past trading volume and spreads. The lagged spread is included, since we ﬁnd strong
positive autocorrelation in the spread series. We also tried adding more lags, but they are in
most cases insigniﬁcant, so we ﬁnd this speciﬁcation to be the best in terms of parsimony and
uncorrelatedness of the OLS residuals.
Given the speciﬁcation in Equation 1, we expect positive signs for all coeﬃcients. Heﬂin
and Shaw (2004) ﬁnd that raw trade size and high-trading-volume half-hours oﬀer almost no
explanatory power for informed trading measures beyond that of trade size to quoted depth.
Therefore it is interesting to obtain results for the regression under the restriction ¯3 = 0 and
¯5 = 0. It turns out that the results and the conclusions vary with the stock trading activity.
Therefore we report results for some stocks, which we classify again in three volume quantiles.
Representatives of the low volume quantile are the stocks of Jack in the Box and Lockheed
Martin, of the middle quantile – Alcoa, Boeing, Coca Cola, Caterpillar and McDonald’s, and
of the large volume quantile – Walt Disney, Citigroup and General Electric. Table 4 lists the
number of signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients out of the 24814 regressions for each stock.
13For example, if there was a buy of 500 shares, while the depth at the ask side was 1000 shares, then
RELSt = 0:5.
14See table note for details.
14Table 5: Number of signiﬁcantly positive parameters in the OLS regression (1)
under the restriction ¯3 = 0 based on t-tests at 1% and 5% signiﬁcance levels,
respectively.
Walt Disney Citigroup GE Caterpillar Alcoa
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
¯1 132 181 234 237 180 205 45 89 65 118
¯2 42 79 58 72 39 55 33 54 42 68
¯4 29 52 116 155 69 96 13 35 22 44
¯5 245 245 246 246 241 241 248 248 246 246
Boeing Coca Cola McDonald’s Jack in the Box Lockheed Martin
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
¯1 100 146 84 137 95 151 16 28 25 50
¯2 45 74 27 53 28 51 5 14 11 19
¯4 17 42 20 53 19 34 7 12 10 19
¯5 247 247 248 248 246 246 118 119 120 120
Note: The regression SPRt = ¯0+¯1RAWSt¡1+¯2RELSt¡1+¯3jSt¡1j+¯4V OLt¡1+¯5SPRt¡1+";
is estimated for each of the 248 days in the sample, except those for which we did not have estimates
of the ordered probit model and jSt¡1j was not available. The stock with the most such cases is GE
with 7 days for which the maximum likelihood did not converge. For Jack in the Box and Lockheed
Martin we have 120 regressions on 2-day samples.
In order to check whether traded size relative to depth subsumes the information of raw
trade size with respect to explaining the spreads, we need to compare the signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients ¯1 and ¯2. If ¯2 is always signiﬁcant, while ¯1 is not, then we ﬁnd strong support
for the hypothesis. From the table it can be seen that for the less active stocks, we rarely
ﬁnd signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (except the estimate for the mean). In this case, this is most likely
a consequence of the small number of observations (on average 325 for Jack in the Box and
1780 for Lockheed Martin), which leads to large standard errors for the parameters. Still,
we ﬁnd that the ¯2 was signiﬁcantly positive in most cases than ¯1. Turning to the middle-
volume quantile, with the exception of Boeing, we ﬁnd strong support that previous relative
trade size explains better the next spread than the raw trade size. For the big companies,
however, the results are just the opposite. One possible explanation is that for these stocks,
the probability of informed trading is generally lower, markets are deeper, and thus the size of
the market order seems to carry information which is by itself more relevant than its relation
to the current depth.
Thus, without accounting for the serial properties of the spread, we ﬁnd some support
for the ﬁndings of Heﬂin and Shaw (2004). Relaxing the constraint ¯5 = 0, however, leads
to quite diﬀerent conclusions. In Table 5 we perform the same analysis, this time with the
single restriction ¯3 = 0. The ﬁrst result we observe is that for most of the stocks, both trade
size measures become less signiﬁcant once the autocorrelation is taken into account. This
holds even stronger for the measure of the previous trading activity. Secondly, now we see
that for all stocks, raw size is signiﬁcant more often than relative size. In general, we can
conclude that with the exception of the large-volume stocks, the three volume measures oﬀer
little additional explanatory power when the serial properties of the dependent variable are
properly accounted for.
15Table 6: Number of signiﬁcantly positive parameters in the OLS regression (1)
based on t-tests at 1% and 5% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
Walt Disney Citigroup GE Caterpillar Alcoa
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
¯1 94 139 215 230 158 190 32 69 37 78
¯2 27 64 43 62 34 47 22 42 40 64
¯3 220 235 236 242 194 212 157 197 137 170
¯4 26 50 120 160 64 96 12 32 18 40
¯5 245 245 246 246 241 241 248 248 246 246
Boeing Coca Cola McDonald’s Jack in the Box Lockheed Martin
1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 5%
¯1 83 115 67 112 52 92 16 23 17 34
¯2 33 60 20 51 14 38 4 10 8 14
¯3 178 212 128 162 231 241 18 41 101 113
¯4 18 38 22 51 14 31 7 13 10 19
¯5 247 247 248 248 246 246 118 119 120 120
Note: The regression SPRt = ¯0+¯1RAWSt¡1+¯2RELSt¡1+¯3jSt¡1j+¯4V OLt¡1+¯5SPRt¡1+";
is estimated for each of the 248 days in the sample, except those for which we did not have estimates
of the ordered probit model and jSt¡1j was not available. The stock with the most such cases is GE
with 7 days for which the maximum likelihood did not converge. For Jack in the Box and Lockheed
Martin we have 120 regressions on 2-day samples.
Next, we consider the explanatory power of the surprise measure on spreads. Similarly,
in Table 6 we list the number of positively signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the unrestricted model.
The results clearly indicate that the surprise measure which we construct, oﬀers additional
explanatory power and is by far the most important determinant of the next spread, after
conditioning on the previous spread. With the exception of the smallest stock (Jack in the
Box) in our whole sample of 24 stocks, we ﬁnd strong support for the hypothesis that the
specialist reacts to surprising trades by widening the spread. Of course, what we deﬁne as a
"surprising trade" is not necessarily invoked by information, but the results clearly indicate
that they have an impact on liquidity, making the market less tight. This has as a consequence
larger trading costs for subsequent traders, since the market-maker will try to transfer the
possible losses of trading with an informed trader to other market participants who trade
afterwards.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between a proxy for information based trading and spreads.
The availability of trade and quote datasets allows for classifying the trades according to their
relation to the quoted depth at the corresponding side of the market. Using a model for the
analysis of ordinal level dependent variables, we specify a model for the conditional mean of
trade categories, which is a function of current market conditions. These variables enter the
information set of the investor and determine his trading behavior. The dataset limitations
notwithstanding, we ﬁnd that the model performs well in terms of predicting the middle
categories. Furthermore, the likelihood based estimation technique allows for tests of market
16microstructure hypotheses about the impact of certain market variables as volatility, and
market activity on the buy-sell pressure. Our results indicate that the prevailing spread at
the time of the transaction does not aﬀect the buy and sell pressure asymmetrically, which was
also found in other empirical studies. Furthermore, we ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that
short term market volatility and trading intensity do not inﬂuence the net buy-sell activity.
The central problem considered in the study is the reaction of spreads to surprising
trades. A surprise measure is constructed by taking the diﬀerence between the prediction of
the next trade category, based on the estimates of an ordered probit model and the category
of the actual trade. Large absolute values of this measure indicate that the market maker
(or a standing limit order) needs to take the other side of an incoming market order, which
was unlikely to be submitted given the current market conditions. Unless having additional
information about who and for what reasons would be willing to trade at the "wrong" time,
the specialist attaches to such an order a greater probability of stemming from an informed
trader. Subsequently, he either quotes a larger spread, or nobody is willing to submit an
aggressive limit order, which leaves the spread wider. This is so, because if the trade was
really initiated by an informed trader, oﬀering a better price again would lead to that trader
trading again and the other side losing.
Existing models for the probability of informed trading rely mostly on aggregated trade
data, which render them unsuitable to infer this probability on the trade-by-trade level. Al-
though we do not quantify this probability, with our approach we can classify single trades
as ones with relatively low or high probability of being informed, depending on the degree of
surprise.
Regression results indicate that our surprise measure is the most important determinant
of spreads, once their serial properties have been accounted for. In particular, it can be shown
that previous trading activity as well as raw and relative trade size deliver little additional
explanatory power, except for large-volume stocks.
17A Econometric Model
The ordered probit model was introduced by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) to analyze ordered
discrete dependent variables. The model was later applied in the ﬁeld of market microstructure
by Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992) and Pohlmeier and Gerhard (2000), among others, to
analyze the determinants of transaction stock prices and volatility, and by Beber and Caglio
(2003) who investigate order submission strategies based on current market conditions.
A.1 Description of the Model
Let Z¤
t be a continuous random variable. The conditional mean of Z¤
t is driven by some
predetermined variables Xt, a q £ 1 vector:
Z¤
t = X0
t¯ + "t; E["tjXt] = 0; "t INID N(0;¾2
t): (2)
Instead of observing Z¤
t , we observe the discrete variable Zt, which is related to its continuous
counterpart in the following manner:
Zt =
8
> > > > > > <











where ¹i; i = 0;:::;M are threshold parameters with ¹0 = ¡1 and ¹M = 1.
As noted in Equation (2) we let the error term be conditionally heteroscedastic. This is
mainly motivated by the irregularly spaced observations which led us to assume a duration




1Dt, where °0 = 1 for identiﬁca-
tion purposes (see Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992)15) and Dt is the duration in seconds
between the trade at time t and the previous one.
Given this structure of the model, the distribution of Zt, assuming normally distributed
15This has to do with the fact that the likelihood is unchanged if the threshold parameters, the ¯’s and
¾t are multiplied by the same number. This implies that the parameters are estimated up to a scaling factor
1=°0.
18"t’s, is:
Pr[Zt = si jXt;Dt] = Pr
£
X0
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if i = M;
where © is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In order to estimate the
probabilities Pr[Zt = si jXt;Dt], we need estimates for the q£1 vector ¯, the M ¡1 threshold
parameters, and the parameter °1 of the conditional heteroscedasticity speciﬁcation.
In order to interpret the signs of the coeﬃcients and their impact on observing a given
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¾t ; i = M:
A.2 Estimation of the Model
The model is estimated with maximum likelihood, assuming a normally distributed error term.
In order to write the likelihood function in a compact form we introduce some additional
notation, following McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) who derive results for the homoscedastic

















; k = 1;:::;M:
19Deﬁne Yt;k is an indicator which takes the value of 1 if Zt = sk, and 0 otherwise. The




Yt;k log(©t;k ¡ ©t;k¡1): (3)
Let ±i;j be the Kronecker delta deﬁned by:
±i;j =
½
1; if i = j
0; otherwise.













































The function in Expression (3) is maximized numerically, using the analytical gradient vec-
tor given above. The covariance matrix for the parameters is estimated by quasi-maximum
likelihood, which is heteroscedasticity-consistent.
16c.f. McKelvey and Zavoina (1975)
20References
Beber, A., and C. Caglio (2003): “Order Submission Strategies and Information: Empirical
Evidence form the NYSE,” Discussion Paper, University of Lausanne, NEWFIN Univesità
Bocconi.
Bikhchandani, S., and S. Sharma (2000): “Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: A Re-
view,” IMF Working Paper WP/00/48.
Bisière, C., and T. Kamionka (2000): “Timing of Orders, Order Aggressiveness and the
Order Book at the Paris Bourse,” Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 60, 43–72.
Chan, L. K. C., N. Jegadeesh, and J. Lakonishok (1996): “Momentum Strategies,”
Journal of Finance, 51(5), 1681–1713.
Easley, D., N. M. Kiefer, M. O’Hara, and J. B. Paperman (1996): “Liquidity, Infor-
mation, and Infrequently Traded Stocks,” Journal of Finance, 51(4), 1405–1437.
Greene, W. H. (1997): Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New
Jersey.
Hall, A. D., and N. Hautsch (2004): “A Continuous-Time Measurement of the Buy-
Sell Pressure in a Limint Order Book Market,” Discussion Paper, Institute of Economics,
University of Kopenhagen.
Harris, L. (2003): Trading and Exchanges. Market Microstructure for Practitioners. Oxford
University Press.
Harris, L., and J. Hasbrouck (1996): “Market vs. Limit Orders: The SuperDOT Evidence
on Order Submission Strategy,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(2), 213–
231.
Hasbrouck, J. (1991): “Measuring the Information Content of Stock Trades,” Journal of
Finance, 46, 179–207.
Hausman, J. A., A. W. Lo, and A. C. MacKinlay (1992): “An Ordered Probit Analysis
of Transaction Stock Prices,” Journal of Fiancial Economics, 31, 319–379.
Heflin, F., and K. W. Shaw (2004): “Trade Size and Informed Trading: Which Trades Are
"Big"?,” Journal of Financial Research, forthcoming.
Kavajecz, K. A., and E. R. Odders-White (2001): “An Examination of Changes in
Specialists’ Posted Price Schedules,” Review of Financial Studies, 14, 681–704.
Lee, C. M. C., B. Mucklow, and M. J. Ready (1993): “Spreads, Depths, and the Impact
of Earnings Information: An Intraday Analysis,” Review of Fiancial Studies, 6, 345–374.
Lee, C. M. C., and M. J. Ready (1991): “Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data,”
Journal of Finance, 46(2), 733–746.
McKelvey, R. D., and W. Zavoina (1975): “A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Ordinal
Level Dependent Variables,” Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 4, 103–120.
21Petersen, M. A., and S. Umlauf (1994): “Quote Revisions and the Quoted Size: an
Empirical Analysis,” Working Paper, Kellogg School of Management.
Pohlmeier, W., and F. Gerhard (2000): “Identifying Intraday Volatility,” Working Paper,
Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
22